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1 The PSID has been used widely in analyzing, 
among other things, household wealth 
dynamics, occupational choice, and labor supply 
decisions. For a complete reference, see the 
PSID web site: http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/
Publications/Bibliography/Biblio.html.
2 Housing belongs to the category of durable 
consumption goods defined as those that may 
be used repeatedly or continuously over a period 
of more than a year, assuming a normal or 
average rate of physical usage. 
The U.S. residential housing 
market has gone through important 
changes since the mid-1980s. Most
noticeably, significant developments 
have taken place in the housing 
finance system. Continuous improve-
ments in information technology have 
improved lenders’ ability to assess risk, 
tailor products to different population 
segments, and develop new products. 
As a result, down payment require-
ments and transaction costs — e.g., 
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the time, effort, legal costs, and broker-
age costs — associated with mortgage 
applications have come down substan-
tially, making it easier for families to 
qualify for a mortgage or to refinance 
their existing mortgages.
At the same time, the U.S. econo-
my experienced the longest expansion 
in its history, marked by substantial 
growth in household income and 
wealth in the 1990s. Monetary policy 
was accommodative from 1990 to 
1994, and mortgage interest rates fell 
to consecutive historical lows between 
1990 and 1999.
Finally, on the regulatory front, 
Congress passed two laws favorable to 
homeowners: the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 
1997. 
Given these developments, it is 
not surprising that homeownership 
rates and the mortgage indebtedness 
of American families have changed 
in significant ways. We will see how 
significant the changes are by using 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), a longitudinal survey from 
the University of Michigan that has 
followed a nationally representative 
random sample of families and their 
extensions since 1968.1  First, though, 
let us look at why and how households 
make decisions about housing and 
mortgages.
WHAT IS UNIQUE ABOUT 
OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING?
For most homeowners, their house 
is the single most important consump-
tion good2 and, at the same time, the 
dominant asset in their portfolios. 
For instance, the 2001 Survey of 
Consumer Finances shows that about 
two-thirds of U.S. households own 
their primary residence. Home value 
accounts for 55 percent of total assets 
for an average homeowner and more 
than 80 percent for over half of home-
owners.
Similar to other durable consump-
tion goods, such as cars or televisions, 
houses have a minimum size. For 
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most people, their house will be the 
most expensive purchase of their lives. 
Even the least expensive house typi-
cally requires a sizable down payment. 
Housing adjustment — that is, buying 
or selling a house — is also much 
more costly than that of other durable 
goods, with sales commissions often 
amounting to 6 percent of the house 
value.
Despite the sizable down payment 
and sales commissions, compared with 
other financial assets like stocks or 
bonds, housing investment is often 
highly leveraged and relatively illiquid. 
Many home buyers, especially first-
time buyers, borrow over 80 percent of 
the house value. In addition, house-
holds borrow over a much longer time 
horizon for house purchases than for 
other consumer durables, with mort-
gages often lasting as long as 30 years. 
Average tenure in a house — five 
to seven years — is small compared 
with the remaining life of the house; 
thus, like stocks, but unlike short-term 
bonds or deposits, the value of a home 
matters even when the mortgage has 
been paid off. All of these factors sug-
gest that when a household purchases 
a home the investment it has made is 




Like the value of any useful asset, 
a house’s value fluctuates over time. 
Indeed, the record shows that although 
house prices are not as volatile as stock 
prices, they are perhaps more volatile 
than most people have realized. For 
instance, real house prices — house 
prices adjusted for the rate of inflation 
— dropped more than 2 percent in 
1990, then rose more than 4 percent 
in 2001.3 The fluctuation is much big-
ger if we consider regional changes in 
house prices. In San Jose, California, 
between 1990 and 1995 house prices 
tumbled 29 percent. Between 1996 and 
2001, however, house prices skyrock-
eted 84 percent, largely boosted by the 
stock market riches of the high-tech 
and dot-com industries. Then from 
2001 to 2002, during the Internet bust 
and technology slump, house prices in 
San Jose dropped almost 2 percent in 
one year. 
The risk borne by homeowners 
is magnified, since house prices and 
salaries and benefits, the major source 
of income for most households, are 
positively correlated. This means that 
changes in house prices and changes 
in household income in a given area 
often move in the same direction, that 
is, one rises as the other rises or falls as 
the other falls.4
To see why this is true, remember 
that the purchase of a house requires 
a large down payment and a commit-
ment to regular mortgage payments for 
a lengthy period. Thus, fluctuations 
in income can have a big impact on 
both the demand for and the supply of 
housing. For example, imagine a region 
that has experienced mass layoffs due 
to the closing of a local plant. As a 
result, many homeowners may put 
their houses on the market because of 
financial distress caused by lost income 
or because they are moving their 
families to regions with better employ-
ment prospects. At the same time, 
those households that had planned 
to purchase homes put their plans on 
hold either because they also got laid 
off or because they became pessimistic 
about their future earnings potential. 
The increased supply of and reduced 
demand for housing will obviously put 
downward pressure on local house 
prices and cause them to decline.
The volatility in house prices 
means that although houses provide 
comfort and shelter, homeownership 
brings with it substantial financial 
risks. These financial risks are worse in 
bad times when both house prices and 
labor income decline, and they will be 
felt most painfully by homeowners who 
have borrowed heavily to buy their 
houses.
A potential homeowner weighs 
the economic benefits and costs when 
deciding whether to buy a house and 
whether and how much to borrow to 
finance the purchase. Consider two 
households living in the same area. 
One is a young commercial artist in his 
early to mid-twenties, and the other 
is headed by a computer programmer 
and a physician both in their early 
forties. As is typical for his age group, 
the young artist is not married and 
has little wealth. Though his income 
potential may be higher than his cur-
rent income, it is also more uncertain. 
In contrast, the middle-aged couple 
has children, stable jobs, and relatively 
more savings.
In this case, the young household 
is more likely to rent and the middle-
aged one is more likely to own a house. 
In the event that both households 
3 These numbers are calculated using the house 
price index constructed by the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). 4 See, for example, the article by Joao Cocco.
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become homeowners, the young artist 
is likely to borrow more relative to his 
house value and his current income. 
The reason is threefold. First, since 
the young artist’s income is likely to 
rise over his lifetime, he will buy a 
house that reflects future expected 
income. The alternative — purchasing 
a series of larger houses as his income 
increases — is too expensive because 
of the transaction costs of buying and 
selling. The middle-aged household 
expects that its income is at its peak; 
thus, its house primarily reflects cur-
rent income. 
Second, lenders typically require 
down payments to reduce the risk of 
borrowers’ defaulting on their mort-
gage loans. In fact, the agencies that 
dominate the secondary market for 
mortgages, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, follow the traditional practice 
and require mortgage insurance before 
they purchase any loan on a property 
whose mortgage exceeds 80 percent of 
its value. The limited net worth of the 
young artist makes it less likely that he 
can meet this down payment require-
ment. If he does meet the requirement, 
he will likely have to borrow more of 
the rest of the money for the purchase.
Third, the young artist’s income 
is likely to fluctuate more than the 
middle-aged household’s, and it may be 
necessary for him to access his wealth 
to cover expenses when income is low. 
Having a large amount of equity rela-
tive to his net worth tied up in a house 
is risky because of the transaction 
costs in accessing home equity through 
either refinancing the mortgage or 
selling the house. Although taking out 
a home equity loan is relatively cheap 
compared with selling, home equity 
loans that carry an attractive rate 
often require payment over a much 
shorter time frame — say, two to five 
years — and the rate typically floats. 
Also, a homeowner with an outstand-
ing home equity loan will find it 
more difficult to refinance or sell. For 
example, if the household refinances 
the first mortgage before the home 
equity loan is paid off, the new lender 
often requires the consent of the home 
equity lender.  So, if he has wealth over 
and above the required down payment, 
the artist will hold more of it in liquid 
form than in home equity and borrow 
more relative to his house value and 
his income.
As we can see, the decisions to 
buy a house and to take on mortgages 
are complex. Family demographics, 
lifetime expected income, current 







Empirical studies have found that 
age and income are two of the most 
important factors in house-purchase 
and mortgage-finance decisions.5 Us-
ing PSID data from 1984 to 2001, I 
have charted average homeownership 
rates and mortgage indebtedness of 
all homeowners (Figures 1 and 2) and 
by age and by income (Figures 3 and 
4).6 The age of the household is that 
of the head, and household income 
includes labor earnings, unemploy-
ment insurance, and welfare transfers. 
Transfers include unemployment and 
Social Security income.  The degree of 
homeowners’ mortgage indebtedness 
is captured by two different measures: 
mortgage loan-to-value (LTV) ratios 
and debt-service ratios (DSR). The 
LTV ratio is defined as the ratio of 
mortgage principal outstanding to
the current house value. The DSR is 
defined as the ratio of mortgage pay-
ment — principal and interest, plus 
property tax — to family income. 
Mortgage LTV ratios and DSRs 
are important because they give an 
indication of the potential risks lenders 
face should the price of houses fall 
or should the borrowers/homeowners 
suffer a decline in income. Accord-
ingly, lenders use mortgage LTV ratios 
and DSRs to estimate the borrower’s 
default risk and to decide whether to 
fund the mortgage and what rate to 
charge. These ratios also affect the 
underwriting standards of the major 
purchasers of mortgages. For instance, 
as mentioned earlier, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac require mortgage insur-
ance before they purchase any loan on 
a property with an LTV ratio greater 
than 80 percent.7
Empirical Observations. As 
we can see from the figures, home-
ownership rates were essentially flat 
at around 60 percent from 1984 to 
the early 1990s, but subsequently rose 
sharply. By 2001, more than 65 percent 
of households owned their homes. 
Mortgage indebtedness for home-
owners increased steadily between 
1984 and 2001, according to mortgage 
LTV ratios. While the average mort-
gage LTV was 26 percent in 1984, by 
2001, it had increased to more than 35 
percent. The contrast is more striking 
when we look at changes in median 
LTV, which increased from 15 percent 
in 1984 to over 35 percent in 2001. 
The median DSR paints a similar 
5 Joseph Gyourko (2001) provides an excellent 
overview of the factors that affect housing 
decisions.
6 Some readers may worry whether PSID data 
are representative. A preliminary comparison 
with census data shows that both data sets tell 
much the same story.
7 High LTV ratios are associated with greater 
risk of the household’s defaulting provided one 
is very careful in controlling for borrowers’ 
creditworthiness, that is, holding fixed other 
factors that affect household risk of default, for 
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FIGURE 1
Recent Trends in Homeownership Rates*
FIGURE 2
Recent Trends in Mortgage Indebtedness
of Homeowners*
*Mortgage LTV = Principal Outstanding/Current House Value
*Mortgage DSR = Mortgage Payment/Family Income. Mortgage payment data are not 
*available for 1988 and 1989.
Note: PSID data were collected annually through 1997, then bi-annually after that.
*Homeownership rates are measured as percent of households that own their primary 
residences.
Note: PSID data were collected annually through 1997, then bi-annually after that.
picture. According to the mean DSR, 
however, homeowners’ mortgage in-
debtedness was flat from 1984 to 1992, 
then increased appreciably after 1992.
Middle-aged households — those 
whose heads of household are between 
35 and 54 years of age — are generally 
viewed as being at the peak of their 
earnings profile and family size. As 
a result, middle-aged households are 
more likely to own homes than house-
holds in other age groups.8 Surprisingly, 
the middle-aged group experienced 
a slight decline in homeowner-
ship rates, while households in the 
other age groups all had either mod-
est or substantial gains.9 In particular, 
homeownership rates for households 
between ages 35 and 44 dropped from 
71 percent in 1984 to about 63 percent 
in 2001 and homeownership rates for 
households between ages 45 and 54 
dropped from 77 percent to 75 percent.
The other thing that jumps out 
from these figures is that low-income 
households have experienced a dis-
proportionately larger increase in both 
homeownership rates and mortgage 
indebtedness. Specifically, between 
1984 and 2001, when average home-
ownership rates increased 4.6 percent-
age points, households in the 0 to 20th 
percentile of income experienced an 
increase of almost 5 percentage points, 
and households in the 20th to 39th 
percentile experienced an increase of 
8.4 percentage points. When looked 
at in terms of growth rates, that is, 
percent changes, the increases are even 
larger. 
Furthermore, while households 
increased their mean mortgage LTV 
ratio 43 percent, on average, between 
 
8 This is evident in the inverted-U shape of 
average homeownership rates over the life-cycle. 
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The rise in income occurred 
against the backdrop of rising employ-
ment. The national unemployment 
rate trended down over this period, 
from a high of almost 7 percent to 
around 5 percent. This should boost 
the number of home buyers, especially 
low-income households, who cannot 
qualify for mortgages without jobs. 
Rates on 30-year fixed mortgages, 
as reported by Freddie Mac, remained 
FIGURE 3
Homeownership Rates and Mortgage
Indebtedness by Household Age*
*Household age is the age of the head of the household
1984 and 2001, households in the 
lowest 20 percentiles had the largest 
increase of 68 percent. One might 
think this is driven by the households 
whose heads have retired. They are 
typically wealthier than other low-in-
come households and have bought a 
house during their economically active 
years. But the result remains true even 
after we drop from the group families 
with heads 65 and older. 
FACTORS THAT HELP EXPLAIN 
THE TRENDS
As I stressed earlier, the decisions 
to own a home and the amount to bor-
row to finance the purchase are gov-
erned by a number of factors, including 
household income, the presence of 
children, and the cost in obtaining and 
financing mortgages. Each of these fac-
tors has changed over the past decade 
in ways that could help explain the 
generally increased rate of homeown-
ership and the increased mortgage 
leverage for homeowners.  These fac-
tors can be grouped into three broad 
categories: macroeconomic conditions, 
the housing finance system, and the 
regulatory environment.
Macroeconomic Conditions. 
The most important factor is almost 
certainly the favorable economic 
climate of the 1990s. Between 1991 
and 2001, the U.S. economy had the 
longest expansion in postwar his-
tory. The huge increase in household 
income, the general decline in the un-
employment rate, and persistently low 
mortgage rates not only made homes 
more affordable but also led to more 
optimism among households about 
their future income streams, making 
them more likely to buy big items such 
as houses.
Inflation-adjusted average house-
hold income rose 37 percent between 
1984 and 2001, from $27,552 (in 1984 
dollars) to $37,705, for households in 
our sample, contributing to the run-
up in overall homeownership rates. 
Income changes, however, are quite 
uneven across age groups. In particu-
lar, although real household income 
went up for all age groups, the middle-
aged households, especially those be-
tween ages 35 and 44, had the smallest 
growth in family income. This appears 
to be an important factor leading to 
the reduction in homeownership rates 
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below 8 percent for most of the period 
between 1996 and 2001. The low 
mortgage rates reduce the monthly 
payment for a given mortgage and, 
therefore, make houses more afford-
able. This should help drive up the av-
erage homeownership rates for all age 
and income groups. The other effect of 
low mortgage rates is that households 
may choose to borrow more, relative 
to the house value, without increasing 
their monthly payments. This would 
obviously lead to a higher mortgage 
LTV ratio among homeowners.
Innovations in Mortgage Mar-
kets. In the credit markets, techno-
logical developments have automated 
many stages of the lending process. 
For example, credit scoring is now 
commonly used by many lenders, 
thus reducing the costs of evaluating 
borrowers and increasing competi-
tion in mortgage markets. As a result, 
mortgages have become cheaper and 
easier to obtain. 
The required down payment for 
home purchases is now lower than be-
fore the 1990s. Nowadays, homeown-
ers need not have a 20 percent down 
payment to qualify for a mortgage, and 
in some instances, lenders may not 
ask for any down payment at all.10 In 
addition, both the financial and non-
financial transaction costs associated 
with obtaining a mortgage have come 
down.  We’ve seen a continued decline 
in average points and fees on conven-
tional loans closed — from 2.5 percent 
of the average loan amount in 1983 to 
around 1 percent at the end of 1995 
and 0.5 percent in 2004.11 Lower down 
payments and the decline in fees and 
charges associated with mortgages gave 
rise to an increasing volume of both 
mortgage-purchase and mortgage-re-
finance applications, especially in the 
presence of declining mortgage rates.12 
The development of home equity lend-
ing also made housing a more liquid 
asset. From 1990 to 2001, home equity 
loans as a share of total mortgages in-
creased from 10 percent to 14 percent 
according to flow of funds data from 
FIGURE 4
Homeownership Rates and Mortgage
Indebtedness by Income Percentile*
10 Of course, the borrowers may have to pay 
a higher rate or purchase private mortgage 
insurance. According to Bruskin, Sanders, and 
Sykes’ 2001 article, by 1994, lenders had started 
programs that allowed qualified households 
to borrow more than the value of a home, 
effectively creating a negative down payment 
that could be applied to closing costs. These 
innovations enabled some previously ineligible 
households to purchase a house and provided 
many others with increased buying power given 
their wealth.
11 These statistics come from a study by Paul 
Bennett, Richard Peach, and Stavros Peristiani, 
and publications from the Federal Housing 
Finance Board.
12 For example, when the 30-year fixed mortgage 
interest rate dropped from 8.57 percent to 5.10 
percent between May 2000 and January 2003, 
the mortgage refinancing index constructed by 
the Mortgage Bankers Association surged from 
319.3 to 8753.3, a 27-fold increase.
*Percentile is a value on a scale of 100 that indicates the percent of a distribution 
that is equal to or below it. For example, in 2001, the average income of a household 
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the Board of Governors. Together, 
these developments increased house-
holds’ access to mortgage credit and 
thus increased homeownership among 
all families, particularly low-income 
families. 
Low-income households also got 
an extra push from the development of 
subprime lending (nonprime or credit 
rated below “A”), designed for those 
unable to meet the underwriting crite-
ria of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Ac-
cording to an article by Neal Walters 
and Sharon Hermanson, the subprime 
mortgage lending industry has grown 
significantly in recent years, expanding 
from a $35 billion industry in 1994 to a 
$140 billion industry in 2000. Addi-
tionally, subprime mortgages currently 
represent 13 percent of total mort-
gage originations, an increase from 4 
percent in 1994. Consequently, those 
households with not-so-perfect credit 
records are more likely to own and to 
borrow more relative to their house 
value and to their income now than in 
earlier years. 
Changes in Tax Policies. Before 
the Tax Relief Act of 1986 (TRA-86), 
households could deduct interest paid 
on all types of household debt from 
their pre-tax income. In 1986, Con-
gress changed the law to phase out 
the deductibility of consumer interest 
(interest paid on consumer loans not 
secured by a residence) over a five-year 
period while leaving the deductibility 
of mortgage interest intact. 
The passage of TRA-86 encour-
aged mortgage borrowing as house-
holds reshuffled their portfolios from 
other consumer debt into second 
mortgages and home-equity debt.13 
As a result, mortgage LTV ratios 
took off immediately after 1986.  The 
effect of TRA-86 on homeownership 
rates seemed muted. One reason is 
that TRA-86 also reduced marginal 
tax rates, especially for high-income 
households. As a result, the value 
of tax-exempt imputed income for 
high-income homeowners was also 
reduced, offsetting some of the benefits 
of homeownership associated with the 
mortgage-interest deduction. Another, 
perhaps more plausible, reason is that 
a significant number of households 
may have been unable to put together 
the down payment required to buy a 
house. Put simply, those households 
that do not qualify for a mortgage will 
not be helped by the passage of TRA-
86.
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 
(TRA-97) relaxed the previous re-
quirements for home sellers by exempt-
ing more of the profits from the sale 
of a house from capital gains taxes. 
The new law allows people to deduct a 
larger amount of capital gains from the 
sale of their houses even if they have 
not stayed in the house for two years as 
long as the move is due to a job change 
or a change in family structure (e.g., 
a death in the family). The passage of 
TRA-97 obviously provided additional 
benefits for homeownership, especially 
for young households. Because young 
households are more likely to move 
as part of a change in jobs, the risk 
of buying and being forced to move 
within two years is higher for them.
Stronger Enforcement of Fair 
Lending Laws. Although the federal 
government has put in place a number 
of fair lending laws, both policymakers 
and economic researchers have ex-
pressed broad concerns about discrimi-
nation in credit markets, especially 
the mortgage market. Many studies 
have documented that minority loan 
applicants have significantly higher 
rejection rates than majority applicants 
with the same observable characteris-
tics.14 Although it is debatable whether 
the higher rejection rates necessarily 
indicate discrimination, these studies 
raised concerns about the enforcement 
of these laws.15 
In 1990, two prominent fair-lend-
ing laws — the Community Reinvest-
ment Act and the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act — were refocused to 
better ensure compliance with the law. 
The Community Reinvestment Act is 
intended to encourage depository in-
stitutions, such as banks, to help meet 
the credit needs of the communities in 
which they operate, including low- 
and moderate-income neighborhoods. 
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
provides data that are used to deter-
mine whether financial institutions 
are serving the housing needs of their 
communities and to identify possible 
discriminatory lending patterns. The 
refocusing of these two laws benefited 
minority and low-income households 
and helped increase their homeowner-
ship rates and mortgage borrowing.16
HOUSING AND THE RECENT 
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN
Housing wealth fluctuates over 
time, and more and more American 
families own homes and more and 
more of them are holding large mort-
gages relative to their house value and 
income. Under such circumstances, we 
would expect such fluctuations to have 
13 See the article by James Poterba and the one 
by Dean Maki.
14 See, for example, recent works by Alicia 
Munnell, Geoffrey Tootell, Lynn Browne, and 
James McEneaney, and by David Blanchflower, 
Phillip Levine, and David Zimmerman.
15 See the article by John Walter for a review 
of the enforcement of some of the fair lending 
laws.
16 Raphael Bostic and Breck Robinison 
argue that the effectiveness of CRA 
agreements in increasing lending activity 
is ultimately determined by the persistence 
and sophistication of community groups in 
monitoring compliance with CRA agreements. 
For discussions on other related housing 
policies, see the Business Review article by 
Satyajit Chatterjee and the one by N. Edward 
Coulson and the papers cited in those articles.32   Q1 2005 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org   Business Review  Q1 2005  33 www.philadelphiafed.org
a large impact on consumption. For 
example, policymakers and academics 
widely believe that the steady increase 
in house value was the driving force 
behind increases in consumption 
expenditures during the economic 
softening and downturn between 1999 
and 2001, when output growth slowed 
and the stock market plummeted.17 
Using aggregate data on consump-
tion and wealth, researchers have 
found that households’ willingness 
to increase consumption when their 
wealth permanently increases is about 
the same whether the wealth increase 
is the result of owning stocks or hous-
ing: between 4 and 10 cents for each 
dollar of increased wealth.18 Given 
the nearly $5000 billion drop in stock 
market wealth held by households 
and nonprofit organizations and the 
nearly $2000 billion increase in hous-
ing wealth as reported in the Federal 
Reserve Board’s flow of funds,19 we 
can conclude that increases in hous-
ing wealth offset close to half of the 
hit to consumption from declining 
stock market wealth between 1999 
and 2001.20  That is, increased housing 
wealth raised consumption by ap-
proximately $100 billion during this 
period.21
Since one important way for 
households to transform higher hous-
ing wealth into consumption is to ex-
tract home equity through selling the 
house, refinancing the mortgage, or 
taking out a home equity loan, it is not 
surprising that we observed an increase 
in mortgage LTV ratios from 1999 to 
2001. Having said this, we should note 
that the calculations relating changes 
in consumption to changes in wealth 
refer to long-run effects. In the short 
run, one would imagine consumption 
may adjust more sluggishly to changes 
in wealth, especially to those in hous-
ing wealth. The numbers we present 
almost surely overestimate the positive 
effect of housing wealth on consump-
tion in the short run. 
17 In their recent study, Erik Hurst and 
Frank Stafford found that as mortgage rates 
plummeted between 1991 and 1994, cash-out 
refinancing produced an estimated expenditure 
stimulus of at least $28 billion. Speaking at the 
2003 Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum, Frank 
Stafford also pointed out that people who 
paid premium rates to refinance in the late 
1990s often subsequently got into financial 
distress and pulled back spending. As a result, 
policymakers cannot expect to use the mortgage 
refinancing channel recurrently over short 
periods. (For a more complete summary of 
Stafford’s remarks at the Policy Forum, see 
Loretta Mester’s article in the Business Review, 
Third Quarter 2004.)  
18  See the articles by Morris Davis and Michael 
Palumbo; Wenli Li; and Sydney Ludvigson and 
Charles Steindel. In a separate paper, however, 
Martin Lettau and Sydney Ludvigson argued 
that households increase spending by only 
60 cents for a $100 increase in wealth, since 
individuals view most of the change in wealth as 
transitory. See the summary by Loretta Mester.
Before concluding, it is worth 
pointing out that the investigations 
here were conducted on primary 
residences only. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that important changes had 
also occurred in ownership of second 
homes, such as vacation homes, during 
the same period. 
SUMMARY
During the last decade or so, more 
American families have become home-
owners, homeowners have become 
more leveraged in financing their 
purchases, and the changes are uneven 
across households of different ages and 
incomes. Three primary factors help 
explain this observed trend: improve-
ment in housing finance systems, an 
accommodating economic climate, 
and regulatory changes. Of course, 
more formal analyses are needed to 
quantify exactly the contribution of 
changes in each factor to the observed 
trends and to model the exact chan-
nel through which housing wealth has 
affected consumption.
The importance of these trends is 
underscored by looking at the role of 
housing in the recent economic slow-
down and recovery. The stock market 
declines in 2000-2002 might have 
suggested a large decline in consumer 
spending. But instead of falling as con-
sumer spending usually does during re-
cessions, it continued to rise (albeit at 
a slower rate). This no doubt reflected 
the effects of stimulative monetary and 
fiscal policies, but as we discussed here, 
housing wealth may have also played 
a role by providing a cushion for many 
homeowners.
19 The numbers are inflation adjusted using 
chained core PCE, with 2000 as the base year.
20 Here I am treating the house price movement 
as independent of stock price changes. There 
are obvious reasons to believe that part of the 
housing boom is due to households’ redirecting 
their investment from the stock market to 
housing.
21 This assumes a marginal propensity to 
consume out of wealth of 0.05, that is, a $5 
increase in consumption for each $100 increase 
in wealth. B R34   Q1 2005 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org   Business Review  Q1 2005   35 www.philadelphiafed.org
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